Neo-representationalism holds that, in order for a candidate to be considered an artwork, it must be about something. Moreover, what an artwork expresses may itself be the artwork or art in general. This concept can be restated as the claim that, in order to be regarded as an artwork, a candidate must possess some form of semantic content.

According to neo-representational aesthetics, every artwork must possess the property of aboutness. This theory often proves useful in accounting for certain modern works of art that are difficult to handle through more traditional aesthetic theories. For instance, take Duchamp’s Fountain. Under neo-representationalism, there is a strong argument for why this piece deserves recognition as art. Nevertheless, some people still raise doubts. The primary reason is that such artworks appear identical to their mass-produced counterparts—i.e., there seems to be no perceptual difference between a urinal in a public restroom and Duchamp’s Fountain.

Why, then, do we treat these two visually indistinguishable objects differently?

The neo-representationalist proposes a hypothesis: Duchamp’s readymade possesses intentionality, whereas the mass-produced urinal does not. This is regarded as an inference to the best explanation. But what does it mean to say that a readymade artwork possesses intentionality? It means that the artwork conveys a subject—that it is about something. For example, Fountain can be interpreted as asserting that art does not require physical labor or technical skill.

The readymade, in this sense, invites interpretation. Asking “what is it about?” makes sense. Numerous interpretations of Duchamp’s Fountain attempt to answer precisely this question. On the other hand, asking what a public urinal is “about” seems absurd. Such objects do not have semantic content—they are meaningless.

In this way, neo-representationalism offers a powerful framework for resolving central issues in contemporary art. However, whether this theory should be proposed as a general theory of art remains a significant question. Is intentionality a necessary condition for all art? How can we generalize the property of aboutness?

Neo-representationalism clearly claims that intentionality or semantic content is a necessary condition of all artworks. However, semantic content is not unique to art. Many other things—such as sermons or advertisements—also contain semantic content. Thus, it seems evident that intentionality is not a distinctive feature of art alone. Yet the question remains: is aboutness still a required property for something to count as art?

One premise that might support this view is that all artworks require interpretation. Indeed, many critics and art theorists seem to engage in interpretive acts when encountering artworks. It also appears natural to assume that all art calls for interpretation. And if something requires interpretation, then it must be saying something—it must have a subject worth commenting on. The necessity of interpretation thus implies aboutness. Therefore, if it is true that all artworks require interpretation, then it follows (almost deductively) that all artworks are about something.

This argument is logically valid, but that does not necessarily make its conclusion true. The truth of the conclusion hinges on the truth of the initial premise—that all artworks require interpretation. However, this premise does not seem obviously true. Many contemporary artists deliberately produce works that resist interpretation or that convey no explicit meaning. These works seem to challenge the very idea that all artworks require interpretation.

Yet upon closer inspection, such works may in fact reinforce the neo-representationalist position. For example, artworks that claim to be “meaningless” or “uninterpretable” may paradoxically express that very lack of meaning or interpretability. In doing so, they reaffirm the role of aboutness—they are about the absence of meaning.

The more serious counterexamples to neo-representationalism might be found in pure symphonic music or decorative art. Neo-representationalists argue that such works still possess expressive properties, and that these expressive properties are what they are about. But this claim is questionable. Suppose a symphony is described as “sad.” Is it really about sadness? Does it have a subject in the way that a text does? It seems more accurate to say that the music simply has the property of being sad. But possessing a property is not the same as being about that property. Just as saying “my hair is black” is not the same as saying “my hair is about blackness,” so too a sad symphony is not necessarily about sadness.

Therefore, pure symphonic music and non-representational architecture may serve as counterexamples. These works are aesthetic rather than semantic. They may possess beauty or emotional resonance, but they do not seem to point beyond themselves toward any specific content. Such art may stimulate or delight, but they are not about the stimulation or delight they cause.

Neo-representationalism, unlike classical mimesis theory, offers a broad framework capable of encompassing a wide range of art—from ancient to contemporary. However, the existence of these counterexamples suggests that it may not fully succeed as a truth-tracking theory of art.

Summary

Neo-representationalism is a theory of art that claims every artwork must possess the property of aboutness—that is, it must be about something. While this theory is broad enough to encompass much of art history, it faces strong counterexamples, particularly in decorative or non-representational arts. Therefore, despite its explanatory power, neo-representationalism may fall short as a complete theory of art.