In Dickie’s theory, one of the conditions for something to become a work of art is the introduction of the concept of the “artworld.” This is the same concept presented in Arthur Danto’s essay The Artworld. Danto’s theory begins with the question: “What is the difference between a work of art and a mere real thing?” In response, Danto argues that “to see something as art requires something the eye cannot find—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.” Danto also claims that a work of art is a bearer of meaning that makes a kind of statement. This means that a work of art exists only within a context of interpretation, becoming a medium of interpretation itself.

In his early account, Dickie defined a work of art as an “artifact” and as “a set of aspects to which a status has been conferred as a candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of the artworld.” This was a classificatory definition. The definition can be elaborated in five ways. First, “classificatory” means as opposed to “evaluative”: his definition distinguishes art from non-art, but does not judge good from bad. Second, by “institution,” he does not mean a fixed corporation or organization, but rather an established practice. Third, the people who represent established artistic practices include artists, producers, museum directors, spectators, and critics. Fourth, the phrase “an artifact conferred the status of candidate for appreciation” refers to objects granted such a status because they are considered worth experiencing—for example, a painting hung in a museum or a play performed on stage. By contrast, the back of a canvas is not conferred that status and thus is not exhibited. Fifth, “conferred the status” is comparable to acts such as a king conferring the title of count, or members appointing someone as chair. However, in this case the act of conferral is clearly less formal and regulatory than legal conferrals of status. From the start, Dickie’s definition of art revealed various difficulties.

H. Gene Blocker criticizes this point, stating: “A definition of art should tell us why some objects are classified as art, but Dickie’s definition gives the disappointing answer that ‘an object is a work of art because it is called a work of art.’” In this way, the criticisms of Dickie’s early theory can be summarized:

First, his definition provides no actual criteria, nor is it grounded in institutional facts. Second, the condition of being “a candidate for appreciation,” which is supposed to distinguish artworks from other things, is far too broad to specify what is unique about art.

Accepting these criticisms, Dickie develops his later institutional theory in Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. He admits that he had not sufficiently considered the concept of “artifact.” Whereas earlier he treated an artifact simply as something made, later he revised the concept: an artifact is something transformed by an artist’s creative activity. Moreover, such creative activity includes not only material production but also conceptual production. As an example, he cites Duchamp’s Fountain. The urinal, as an industrially manufactured ready-made, was not in itself an artifact in Dickie’s sense, since no artistic creative activity was involved. But Duchamp incorporated invisible, conceptual elements into it and slightly altered it (e.g., inscribing words, displaying it sideways). Through these acts, the urinal was transformed into Fountain. Thus, Dickie argues, the concept of artifact is valid only within the framework of the artworld.

Criticism of Dickie’s early institutional theory was not only directed at the concept of artifact but also at the notion of “conferral.” The claim that “artworks are conferred the status of art by the artworld” seemed overly authoritarian and unwarranted. In his later work, Dickie revised this, saying that status is not so much conferred as acquired in another way.

To better understand Dickie’s later theory, it is useful to compare it with M. C. Beardsley’s notion of the “Romantic Conception of the Artist.” Beardsley holds that the Romantic artist’s creative powers alone make art possible—that art can be created independently of institutions, within the artist’s own world. This stands in contrast to Dickie’s institutional approach. Beardsley also distinguishes between institution-types (established practices) and institution-tokens (specific performances within those practices). He criticizes Dickie’s use of “artworld” as referring to an institution-type, arguing: “If the artworld is an institution-type and not an institution-token, how can it confer status on behalf of particular practices?” For Beardsley, only institution-tokens can confer such status.

Dickie fully accepts this argument. He concedes that creative activity does not include an act of conferral. Thus, he concludes that what the institutional approach ultimately means is that “an object becomes art because of the place it occupies within a cultural practice.” Even apart from the fact that artistic materials are sourced socially, Dickie holds that artists cannot stand outside their relation to society: their ideas, skills, and concepts are all acquired within society, including its culture and artworld. This does not directly settle the question of whether art is fundamentally institutional. But if the artist’s historically conditioned ideas extend not only to materials (both physical and conceptual) but also to the very conception of art itself, then art may indeed be fundamentally institutional. By “conceptions of art itself,” Dickie means the ideas surrounding the practice of art-making. Since artists always create with some basic understanding of art formed socially, those conceptions can themselves be considered institutional. In short, what Dickie calls the “art institution” is a kind of framework. This framework is typically acquired by people who, having seen and recognized cases of art, experienced them, trained in artistic techniques, or gained background knowledge of art, are thus able to recognize art.

Returning to the debate between Beardsley and Dickie: Beardsley claimed that the Romantic artist, through “creative imagination,” could create art independently of any framework. Dickie counters that while this is theoretically possible, it is practically impossible. For in the modern world, no person exists who is wholly ignorant of art concepts or utterly outside an artworld. Even if such a person hypothetically produced something that could be seen as art, members of society would lack the cognitive framework to recognize it as art. Therefore, Dickie concludes that Beardsley’s Romantic artist is impossible.

Dickie insists that for something to become a work of art, the artist’s responsibility must exist within a framework. While he describes this framework as the art institution, he also emphasizes the role of the “public.” This public is not a mere collective but a group possessing knowledge and understanding comparable to what is demanded of artists. The public’s abilities include ordinary capacities like sensitivity, but others require special training and cultivation. Thus, an object becomes a work of art only when it is presented to such a public as a candidate for appreciation. This is consistent with his institutional account, though more specific in emphasis. In the end, art is “an artifact produced by someone performing a cultural role” that must “exist within a cultural framework—the artworld.”

Summary

Dickie argues that for something to become art, it must be an artifact and must acquire the status of candidate for appreciation within the institutional framework of the artworld. By “artifact,” he means something produced through an artist’s creative activity. “Acquiring status from the artworld” can be understood as entering into relations with the artworld, which is composed of people trained in or possessing the capacities shaped by cultural practices. This relational bridge is what turns something into a work of art.